Skip to main content

Overview

An organisation’s security strategy comprises its chosen balance of approaches and specific measures. These are informed by the risk assessment process, together with the organisation’s principles and values. This chapter introduces the three broad, overlapping approaches that can shape a security strategy: acceptance, protection and deterrence.

Chapter summary
  • Acceptance measures attempt to reduce or remove threats by increasing the acceptance (the political and social tolerance) of an organisation’s presence and its work in a particular context.
  • Protection measures aim to reduce vulnerability to the threat but do not affect the threat itself – this is often called ‘hardening the target’.
  • Deterrence measures aim to deter a threat with a counter-threat, such as the use of force (the classic example is armed guards).

Although acceptance, protection and deterrence are sometimes seen as separate strategies, in practice an organisation will usually choose a mix of options from each, depending on the operating environment. In different settings and as risks evolve, it may be appropriate to shift the emphasis from one type of measure (or overarching approach) to another. Rather than a static triangle, therefore, it may be more useful to imagine overlapping and interactive spheres (see Figure Xa), which can vary in emphasis depending on the context, risks and organisational strategy (see Figure Xb).

<br />
<b>Warning</b>:  Undefined variable $img in <b>/var/www/vhosts/gpr8.humanitarianoutcomes.org/httpdocs/wp-content/themes/chd/snippets/global.php</b> on line <b>20</b><br />
<br />
<b>Warning</b>:  Undefined variable $img in <b>/var/www/vhosts/gpr8.humanitarianoutcomes.org/httpdocs/wp-content/themes/chd/snippets/global.php</b> on line <b>20</b><br />

Given their principles and values, many humanitarian organisations view acceptance as the most appropriate and effective overarching approach and make it the foundation of their security strategy.

Acceptance is often understood as reducing or removing potential threats by cultivating and maintaining relationships with relevant stakeholders and gaining their ‘consent’ to operate in a particular location. In practice, acceptance can be more helpfully understood as a continuum, ranging from accepted (most secure) to targeted (most insecure). Acceptance cannot be assumed; it must be actively forged and diligently maintained. ‘Active acceptance’ measures include strategic outreach to a wide range of stakeholders; developing staff skills in social, political and interpersonal relations and communications; and designing and disseminating core messages regarding the organisation’s mission, objectives and programmes. Acceptance measures are not effective against all threats, which is why a combination of measures is often necessary as part of a security strategy.

Protection measures aim to reduce vulnerability. This can be achieved either by hardening the target or by increasing or reducing its visibility. Physical assets and procedures can reduce the likelihood of a threat getting near to the target, or reduce the potential impact of harm on the target. In practice, this could mean, for example, site security equipment, such as installing lighting and alarm systems, erecting perimeter walls or installing metal gates and metal bars on windows. Low-visibility programming has become increasingly common, especially when acceptance is not a viable approach. This can involve, for example, removing organisational branding from office buildings, staff, vehicles and residences.

Deterrence seeks to prevent attacks by convincing potential aggressors that the costs or consequences of action would outweigh any potential gains. There are a number of potential deterrents, including using legal or diplomatic leverage or threatening the suspension of operations. Armed protection is the strongest form of deterrence used by aid organisations. The relationship between armed protection and humanitarian action is fraught. Although virtually all aid organisations at one time or another have used some form of armed protection, it is often considered anathema to the humanitarian ethos, and discussions about it are highly sensitive. Cooperation with an armed actor – including a UN-mandated force – can lead local, national and international actors, as well as the population, to associate humanitarian organisations and aid recipients with the political and/or military objectives of that armed actor. Before deciding whether to use armed protection, it is advisable to consider the pros and cons in the specific situation, refer to relevant guidelines on the use of armed protection and explore possible alternatives. Organisations benefit from having an organisation-wide policy on the use of armed protection.

Dernier chapitre

Prochain chapitre

4.3Plans et dispositions de sécurité