Combat related-threats and remnants of war

Chapter summary

The first issues to consider in active combat areas are whether the organisation is willing and has the capacity to operate under these conditions, and whether the benefits of doing so (i.e. programme criticality) outweigh the risks. Along with other civilians, humanitarians in these environments are at risk of collateral violence and potentially also direct targeting by armed actors, for which security risk management efforts can often do little beyond avoiding the highest-risk locations and adopting sheltering protocols.

Organisations intending to operate in areas of active combat should include the following general considerations in their security risk management planning.

• Risk assessments that incorporate the threats posed by the weapons systems in use in the context.
• Location selection that considers proximity to potential targets and prioritises access to shelter and escape routes.
• Having staff with relevant work experience and specialist training.
• Deconfliction efforts with relevant armed actors.
• Physical protection for sites, such as blast walls, buffer rooms and sheltering measures.
• Personal protective equipment (PPE), such as body armour.
• Specialist training for staff to work in active combat areas, focused on security skills as well as psychological resilience.

In general, staff should aim to avoid direct exposure to active combat, and when that is not possible, minimise time spent in open areas and avoid predictable patterns of movement. Armoured vehicles and fortified shelters can be critical mitigation measures. When dealing with the threat of collateral violence from airstrikes, it is important to remember that high-risk locations are those anywhere in the proximity of high-value targets, where destruction would be militarily advantageous. A mitigation measure would be to avoid high-value target locations. Local knowledge can be extremely helpful in managing the risks associated with mines, IEDs, and UXOs.

The risk of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats is no longer negligible for aid workers, although it remains low. For risk mitigation purposes, key questions to consider include who the most at-risk staff would be (such as medical personnel), whether there are expert-informed standard operating procedures that can be adopted (such as the use and nature of PPE), what contingency plans can be put in place (such as withdrawal, evacuation and emergency medical support) and whether specialist training is advisable for the most at-risk staff, such as how to reduce exposure if contamination is suspected. Any security risk management measures must be informed by specialists.